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1.  Introduction 
 
Corruption is often defined as an incident where a public official breaks a rule or sells 
government property for private gain (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Banerjee et al. 2011).  A 
large body of existing literature has shown that corruption can hamper economic growth by 
creating  inefficiencies  in  public  spending  or  lowering  the  private  sector’s  investment 
incentives.  Studies based on macro data and perception-based indices of corruption report a 
negative correlation between corruption indices and various measures of economic growth, 
and those based on micro data document how corruption causes inefficiencies and imposes 
unnecessary burden on firms.
1   
The bulk of existing research has been on understanding the causes and consequences of 
corruption  at  the  aggregate  level   based  on  macro -level  perception-based  measures  of 
corruption. Although there are some studies on the effect of cor ruption at the firm level, 
relatively  less effort has been directed towards  understanding  micro-level  corruption that 
befalls households.
2  Investigating the microeconomic aspect of the relationship between the 
burden of corruption and characteristics of households is important for several reasons.  First, 
corruption  can  directly  affect  the  welfare  of  households,  which  is  more  relevant  than 
conventionally  used  GDP  growth  per  capita   for  measures  of  economic  development .
3  
Second,  to the extent that  the burden of corruption may be unevenly distributed among 
households, corruption may affect inequality, which in turn can affect economic growth.  For 
example, if corruption in poor countries exacerbates inequality, then Barro’s (2000) evidence 
suggests that corruption may further hamper economic growth in those countries.  Finally, 
understanding  the  detailed  mechanism  of  how  corruption  affects  the  delivery  of  public 
service will help formulate effective policy formulation in tackling corruption. 
This paper adds to the growing literature on corruption in the provision of public service 
experienced by households.
4  Specifically, we examine the incidence and amount of bribe 
households pay for their children’s primary and secondary education in Bangladesh, which is 
                                                      
1 Banerjee et al. (2011) provides a comprehensive review of the related literature. For a review of the empirical literature 
based on macro or micro data, see also Aidt (2009).  The related theoretical studies are surveyed in Aidt (2003). 
2 Among the studies based on micro-level data, Swamy et al. (2001), Hunt (2004, 2007a, 2007b), Hunt and Laszlo (2005), 
Deininger and Mpuga (2005), and Mocan (2008) are  focused on corruption at the individual level.   Kaufmann and Wei 
(1999), Svensson (2003), Fisman and Svensson (2007) rely on firm-level data to study the corrupt interactions between firms 
and public officials. 
3 See Aidt (2009) for a discussion on using genuine wealth per capita as a measure of economic development. 
4 Corruption in our setting refers to various types of illegal payments that the provider of public service demands from 
individual households, even though the service is to be provided free of charge.  In this sense, it corresponds to what Shleifer 
and Vishny (1993)  called ‘corruption without theft’, which may be also called ‘non-collusive corruption’ (Foellmi and 
Oechslin, 2007). 3 
 
normally to be provided free of charge.  We are mainly interested to see whether or how 
corruption has different effects on households with different socio-economic status, which 
will provide indirect evidence on the relation between corruption and inequality.   
Our empirical analysis is based on the 2007 household survey data on school education 
collected  by  Transparency  International  Bangladesh  (TIB).    Our  survey  measures  actual 
corruption and is representative of the entire population of the country.  The information we 
have  covers  various  demographic  and  socio-economic  characteristics  of  a  household,  the 
mechanisms that corrupt teachers (or schools) use in obstructing households’ access to their 
children’s  education  entitlements  which  we  call  the  red  tape,  and  outcome  variables  on 
whether and how much bribe a household  actually paid.   The red tape variables  capture 
whether teachers held regular class during the school period, whether they forced students to 
take paid extra tuition, and whether they influenced exam results.  The outcome variables 
measure the incidence and the amount of bribe a household paid to have their child admitted 
to school and to receive the stipend for their child.  They also include other extra fees a 
household paid to school without receipt.  Given the free and universal primary education in 
Bangladesh,  none of the above payments  is  a  necessary  cost  for the household  for their 
child’s education.  In addition, the survey has an explicit measure of whether a household has 
used an influential connection in dealing with corrupt teachers, which we call network.  
Our  primary  findings  can  be  summarized  as  follows.    First,  both  the  incidence  of 
corruption  and  the  amount  of  bribe  increase  in  the  level  of  red  tape.    Second,  poorer 
households,  households  with  less  educated  household  head,  and  households  with  girls 
studying in school are more likely to be victims of corruption.  Third, the network variable is 
positively correlated with the household’s social status which is proxied by the household 
head’s education level or the household’s expenditure.  Fourth, households with network are 
able to either bypass the red tape or pay less amount of bribe whether the network variable is 
used directly or instrumented by the household’s expenditure.   
Putting the above results together, we are led to a clear picture of corruption that takes 
place in the education sector.  A corrupt teacher (or school) creates multiple layers of red tape 
that obstruct a household’s access to their child’s education service which is otherwise free.  
Facing the red tape, the household can choose to pay a bribe, or use informal relationships 
with influential people who can influence the bribe-taker on behalf of the household.  Those 
households that find neither of the above options available would either have their child 
receive  sub-quality  education  or  take  their  child  out  of  school  altogether.    The  latter 
households are more likely to be from economically  disadvantaged  groups.  Overall, our 4 
 
results indicate that the burden of corruption is disproportionately borne by the poor, lending 
support to the positive relation between corruption and inequality.  
This paper complements the existing literature in three ways.  First, we provide new 
evidence  on  corruption  by  studying  comprehensive  micro-level  survey  data  that  capture 
actual corruption.  As noted earlier, the bulk of the existing empirical work on corruption is 
based on the macro-level perception-based measures of corruption.  Such measures can be 
prone to shortcomings, which are discussed in, for example, Sik (2002) and Galtung (2006).  
Second,  we  show  that  corruption  in  the  education  sector  can  exacerbate  inequality  due 
primarily  to  informal  networks  to  which  the  rich  have  more  access  than  the  poor.    The 
existing studies on the relation between corruption and inequality report mixed results.  While 
studies based on cross-country and panel data find that inequality increases with corruption 
(Li et al., 2000; Gupta et al., 2002; Gyimah-Brempong, 2002), those based on micro-level 
evidence report the opposite (Svensson, 2003; Hunt, 2004, 2007b; Mocan, 2008).  The mixed 
evidence  warrants  more  studies  on  the  detailed  mechanics  of  how  corruption  works  in 
different  sectors.    Finally,  our  paper  explicitly  shows  that  informal  networks  matter  in 
corruption: households with network are less likely to pay bribes and pay significantly less 
when they do.  The effect of network in corruption has not been incorporated explicitly in the 
existing empirical studies.
5  Although Hunt (2004) discusses how bilateral trusts between the 
service provider and demander can permit the substitution of an implicit quid pro quo for a 
bribe, thereby reducing corruption, her empirical analysis uses only proxy variables that may 
facilitate the formation of bilateral trusts.  In addition, network in our study is different from 
bilateral trusts in that it refers to the informal relationships between the service demander and 
the influential third party  rather than the service provider , who can directly or indirectly 
influence the service provider on behalf of the service demander. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In  Section 2 we discuss the context of the 
study and the data used in the estimation,  which is followed by  some descriptive statistics. 
Section 3 outlines our empirical strategy while the estimation results are presented in Section 
4.  Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
                                                      
5 Network in our study is different from informal social or economic ties formalized in Kingston (2007, 2008) and Çule and 
Fulton (2009).  In Kingston (2007) and Çule and Fulton (2009), the focus is on informal ties between bribe demander and 
bribe-payer: Kingston (2007) shows how informal ties can facilitate enforcement of collusive arrangement while Çule and 
Fulton (2009) argue how such ties can help corrupt agents to coordinate into the bad equilibrium. Thus informal ties in both 
of these studies are conducive to corruption.  On the other hand, Kingston (2008) considers informal relationships among 
bribe payers that help them to enforce agreements against paying bribes. 5 
 
2.  Study Context, Data, and Descriptive Statistics 
2.1.  Corruption in the Education Sector in Bangladesh 
 
Bangladesh was ranked the lowest for five consecutive years from 2001 to 2005 in the 
global Corruption Perception Index developed by Transparency International, although the 
position marginally improved in 2006 and 2007 (6
th and 7
th, respectively).  Perception-based 
governance  indicators  prepared  by  the  World  Bank  (2007)  also  show  low  ratings  for 
Bangladesh on six key indicators, with a particularly poor rating for the control of corruption, 
regulatory quality and rule of law.  In addition, an investment climate survey by the World 
Bank (2003) covering 1001 manufacturing firms operating in Bangladesh reports that nearly 
60 percent of these firms stated corruption as the most serious constraint followed by poor 
infrastructure. 
Over the past decades, the education sector in Bangladesh has seen some improvement in 
school  enrolment  and  gender  parity.  This  has  been  made  possible  by  the  government’s 
various stipend programs for children in primary and secondary schools.  The government 
has adopted a universal primary education system that is free for all children.  Incentives to 
attend  primary  school  have  been  introduced  with  the  distribution  of  free  textbooks  and 
provision of ‘food for education’—the latter was converted to a cash stipend in 2002.
6  To 
increase school enrolment and reduce drop-out rates especially for girls, the government also 
provides scholarships (Upabritti) and financial assistance for female students in secondary 
school.
7  Large part of the country’s national budget is set aside to help put these programs in 
action and to make education more accessible. 
Despite  government  efforts  to  improve  the  education  sector,  there  have  been  some 
setbacks in recent years.  Over the period of 2003-2009, total primary school enrolment fell 
from 94 percent to 79 percent for boys and 91 percent to 81 percent for girls.
8 According to a 
2008 report by Bangladesh  Bureau of  Educational Information and  Statistics (BANBEIS, 
2008), nearly 50 percent of primary school students drop out before they complete grade five, 
and the grade-10 completion rate is less than 20 percent.  
                                                      
6 The government provides a stipend of 100 taka (US$1.5) for one student and 125 taka (US$1.9) for two or more students 
from the same family. 
7 Under the girls’ stipend program, all girls in rural areas who enter secondary school are eligible for a monthly sum ranging 
from 25 taka in Class 6 to 60 taka in Class 10 (between US$0.37– $0.88 as of July 2006). They also receive additional 
payments for new books. The conditions to get stipend are (1) a minimum of 75 percent attendance rate, (2) at least a 45 
percent score in annual school exams, and (3) staying unmarried until sitting the Secondary School Certificate or turning 18. 
8 Bangladesh Economic Review, 2010 6 
 
One possible reason for the deteriorating enrolment and high drop-out rates could be 
corruption.
9   According to  Transparency  International  Bangladesh’s  Corruption  Database 
Report 2005 (TIB, 2006), education was ranked the most corrupt sector.
10  Corruption in the 
education sector in Bangladesh takes various forms.  It is often the case that final examination 
or entrance examination papers are sold in advance to high-paying candidates or to favour 
particular students.  It is also common to manipulate oral or practical examination results.  
This practice is even more open to corruption as evaluations are subjective and difficult to 
monitor.  Although primary education is free for all, it becomes prohibitively expensive for 
poor families as reality requires paying for private tutors in order to pass.   This private 
tutoring is likely to exacerbate inequalities, as teachers provide paid supplementary tutoring 
after school hours.  These teachers usually teach only part of the curriculum during  school 
hours, and thus force students to pay for the rest during private lessons.  In addition, absent or 
abusive teachers often demand illegal fees.   While nearly half of the poor students in rural 
area get stipends from the government, many are deprived of getting the right amount or face 
frequent problems in getting the stipend on time.   According to TIB (2006), 40 percent of 
households reported having paid  ‘donations’ or bribes to  enroll their children in primary 
schools.    These  illegal  payments  could  be  fees  for  admission  into  school,  payments  for 
textbooks which are to be provided free of charge, fees for sport and recreation purposes, 
subscriptions for religious activities, and fees for examinations.  Teachers beating students, 
mistreating them or fixing final results are also reported to be quite common.
11  
The high drop-out rates and sluggishness in the improvement of school enrolment rates in 
recent years suggest that merely providing cash incentives would not improve the schooling 
outcome for the children.  One potential reason for the high drop-out rates is the negligence 
of teachers  in  performing  their  duties.
12   Although there are officials at the  thana  (sub-
district) level who monitor the activities of teachers, they seldom visit schools.  There are 
                                                      
9 Islam and Choe (2011) report that access to microcredit in rural Bangladesh has a significant negative impact on school 
enrolment primarily because children are taken out from school to work in household enterprise that is established with 
microcredit. 
10 Corruption in the TIB report was measured based on the analysis of the reports from national and local newspapers in 
Bangladesh. Thus corruption was defined in terms of the number of victims rather than financial loss. The most corrupt 
sector was identified if the  corruption in that particular sector exceeded 5 percent of the total reports of all sectors. In the 
report, education, police, health and family welfare sectors were identified as the most corrupt public sector.   
11 A survey conducted by UNICEF (2009) foun d that nine out of 10 children in Bangladesh were physically beaten in 
schools.  In a major incident, a ten -year-old school pupil committed suicide in 2010 after being subject to corporal 
punishment. In August 2010, Bangladesh banned corporal punishment in schools after an upsurge of such incidents, warning 
teachers that they face legal action if they inflict ‘inhuman punishments’ on pupils. 
12 Teacher absence in school is one of the most serious problems in Bangladesh and many other developing countries as 
documented in various studies (Chaudhury et al., 2006; Kremer et al., 2005). Cha udhury et al. (2006) find 15.5 percent 
teacher absence rate in primary schools in Bangladesh. Sometimes teachers do not go to classroom to teach even if they are 
present in school. For example, Glewwe et al. (2000) report from a study in Kenya that 12 perc ent of teachers are absent 
from classroom during class hours even if they are in school. 7 
 
also irregularities in class testing or official exams, where the students who use their teachers 
as  private  tutors  sometimes  get  tips  and  hints  on  possible  exam  questions.    Anecdotal 
evidence suggests there are a number of other irregularities in getting the stipend, which 
include persuasion through influential people, personal request to the head/class teacher or 
payment of bribes/commissions for the entitlement.   
 
2.2.   Data and Summary Statistics 
 
The survey was conducted by TIB in 2007 with a view to identifying the sectors or 
services  where  households  experience  corruption  and  assessing  the  nature  and  extent  of 
corruption and harassment in selected public and private sectors.  Our survey measures actual 
corruption, is representative of the entire population of the country, and primarily captures 
bribes paid in the course of daily life.  TIB usually does year-round scanning of newspapers 
to identify sectors that are found to be very corrupt.  Newspaper reports can be subject to 
bias,  however.    Thus  TIB  conducted  this  household  survey  to  get  a  more  detailed  and 
objective assessment of corruption.  The survey covered households’ experience with mostly 
petty corruption from July 2006 to June 2007.  In the survey, corruption is defined as more 
than bribery: it is defined as abuse of entrusted power for personal gains manifest in six 
common  forms  –  bribery,  negligence  of  duties,  nepotism,  embezzlement,  deception  and 
extortion.  Our focus is on corruption in educational institutions that are either government or 
semi-government schools,
13 where it is expected that teachers provide the same services to 
everybody in the absence of red tape or harassment. 
To select households for the survey, a three stage stratified cluster sampling method was 
followed.    The  Integrated  Multipurpose  Sampling  (IMPS)  Frame  developed  by  the 
Bangladesh  Bureau  of  Statistics was  used as  the  sampling  frame.
14   A total  of  5,000 
households were interviewed from 87 sub -districts  (thana),
15 3,000 from rural areas and 
2,000 from urban areas.  There were 250 Primary Sampling Units (PSU), 150 for rural areas 
and 100 for urban areas.   Then 250 PSUs were distributed in 16 strata according to the 
national population weights of those strata.  At the first stage, PSUs were selected randomly 
                                                      
13 Almost all primary level (grades 1-5) schools are government-managed. Secondary schools (grades 6-10) are mostly semi-
government, often government-subsidized and community-managed but run according to government rules and regulation.  
14 The IMPS design consists of 1,000  Mauzas  distributed  in  16  strata  according  to  rural,  municipality  and  Statistical 
Metropolitan Area (SMA) throughout the country. There were 6 rural, 6 urban and 4 SMA strata. These Mauzas constitute 
the primary sampling units in this sampling frame. 
15 Thana is the local administrative unit where police, judiciary and the educational administration (officers who monitor the 
quality of education) are located. 8 
 
from each of 16 strata.  Then a block of 200 households was constructed randomly from each 
PSU.  As there are some PSUs in the IMPS that have less than 200 households, households 
from adjacent Mauzas were added to those PSUs.  The PSUs covered 62 out of 64 districts in 
Bangladesh with divisional and rural–urban population representations.  In this paper, we 
consider only households reporting interaction with schools for their children’s education.  
They constitute about 72.2 percent or 3,636 households, out of which about 60 percent are 
from rural areas. 
The basic socio-economic and outcome variables at the household level are reported in 
Table 1 with the definition of variables provided in Table A1 in the appendix.  There is not 
much  difference  between  the  characteristics  of  rural  and  urban  households,  except  that 
household  head’s  education  level  is  higher  in  urban  area  and,  not  surprisingly,  rural 
households tend to own more land.  It also shows that urban households are more likely to 
use network in securing education services for their children. 
Table 1 also presents information on three red tape variables: whether teachers did not 
hold regular classes (irregular class), whether teachers forced students to take private tuition 
(private  tuition),  and  whether  teachers  had  influence  on  exam  results  (exam  influence).  
These variables proxy the red tape that makes it difficult for students to receive education 
services they are entitled to, thereby contributing to corruption.  As for the red tape variables, 
on average about 14 (12, resp.) percent of rural (urban, resp.) students reported that their 
educational institutions did not hold regular classes, 32 (31, resp.) percent reported engaging 
class teachers as private tutors, and 7 (11, resp.) percent reported teachers’ influence on exam 
results.  
Our outcome variables of interests are (i) the incidence of corruption and the amount of 
bribe paid for a child’s admission into school, (ii) the incidence of corruption and the amount 
of bribe paid to receive the stipend for the child, (iii) the incidence of corruption and the 
amount of extra fees and donation paid to school without receipt, and (iv) the amount of total 
bribe paid for a child’s education which, for the purpose of this study, is defined as all illegal 
payments above plus any other informal payments to school.  The summary information on 
these outcome variables shows that about  11  percent of households in rural  areas and  5 
percent  in  urban  areas  paid  bribes  in  getting  their  children’s  admission  to  educational 
institutions. These figures are significant considering the fact that not all of the households 
have children who need to get admission to a  new school in  a given year.  While rural 
households are more likely to pay bribes than their urban counterparts, urban households paid 
considerably more bribes than rural households.  The average bribe an urban household paid 9 
 
for their child’s admission into school is almost five times that of a rural household.  A 
similar pattern is observed in other types of corruption such as the extra payment to receive 
stipend and other payments without receipt: rural households are more likely to be subjected 
to corruption although the amount paid is larger in urban areas.  
 
[Table 1 goes about here.] 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
 
We first examine the factors that determine the probability that a household is subjected 
to various types of corruption, and the amount of bribe a household pays as a result.  We run 
the following reduced-form regression:  
 
                                   (1) 
 
where              is either the incidence a household   in area j paid a bribe to obtain given 
service, or the amount of bribe the household paid.  In the former case, we use a probit model 
to estimate the probability where                  if the household paid a bribe. In the latter 
case,              is the amount of bribe a household actually paid.  It includes the total 
amount of money spent to get service including money paid to others who might have helped 
to get the service.  Since there are also households that did not pay bribes, we use a Tobit 
model in this case. X1  is a vector of demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the 
household reported in Table 1.  We use the household’s expenditure rather than income as the 
former is a better proxy for the household’s permanent income and socio-economic status.
16  
We also control for the gender of children in school to capture the differential effects on 
corruption of having a son as opposed to a daughter in school.  X1 also includes three red-tape 
variables at the school and teacher level.
17 The term    captures the fixed effect specific to the 
police station or thana level.  We also cluster standard errors at the thana level. 
In specification (1) we follow Svensson (2003) and assume that both the incidence of 
corruption  and  the  amount  of  bribe  paid  are  determined  by  the  same  set  of  individual 
characteristics of the private service demander.  This assumption can be more readily justified 
                                                      
16 Following  Hunt  and  Laszlo  (2008),  we  have  also  instrumented  consumption  expenditure  with  household  income  to 
address the possibility of measurement error in consumption. The results are similar to those reported in the paper. 
17 We do not estimate school level fixed effects because of fewer observations per school. Formal institutional mechanisms 
are the same within each thana as thana is the administrative unit.  10 
 
than  in  Svensson.    In  his  study,  firms  that  pay  bribes  have  heterogeneous  dealings  with 
bureaucrats.  Thus the nature of the interaction between firms and bureaucrats may have 
different impact on the incidence of corruption and the amount of bribe.  In our study, the 
interaction between the service supplier and demander is homogenous across agents as they 
deal with only one type of service. 
We next examine how network plays a role in the incidence of corruption and the amount 
of bribe paid.  Our basic estimating equation is as follows: 
 
                                                                               (2) 
 
where         is  a  dummy  variable  which  indicates  if  a  household  had  an  established 
relationship  with  or  took  any  help  from  a  political  leader,  an  elected  local  government 
representative, or other influential people (e.g., school headmaster).  We are mainly interested 
in examining whether such informal networks help overcome the red tape and reduce the 
incidence of bribery.     includes the same demographic and socio-economic variables and 
red tape variables as in X1.  As in (1), we use a probit model to estimate the probability where 
                 if the household paid a bribe and a Tobit model when              is the 
amount of bribe or extra fees a household actually paid. 
Estimating Eq. (2) directly can be problematic, however, since the network variable is 
potentially endogenous.  People with access to informal networks are likely to be different 
from those who do not have any.  Therefore, unobservables that affect the network could also 
affect  our  outcome  variables.    In  order  to  tackle  the  endogeneity  problem,  we  need  an 
instrument that is correlated with network but not with corruption.  It should also satisfy the 
exclusion restriction, i.e., it is orthogonal to the unobservables.  We use education of the 
household head as an instrument for network. The first stage results reported in Table A2 in 
the  appendix  show  that  the  instrument  is  highly  correlated  with  the  network  variable.  
However, for the exclusion restriction to be valid, education of the household head should 
have no direct influence on corruption other than through its effect on network.  We include 
variables that are likely determinants of corruption such as income as well as household and 
individual demographic and other socio-economic characteristics (excluding education)  as 
independent  controls  in  the  econometric  model.  Our  exclusion  restriction  is  then  the 
following:  conditional  on  income,  demographic  variables  and  geographic  fixed  effects; 
education of the household head itself has no direct effect on the probability of corruption at 
school level, other than its influence through network.  Since we have a single instrument for 11 
 
the network, the F-test for the significance of the excluded instrument is just the square of its 
t-statistic in the first-stage.  The conventional tests for the validity of instrument also do not 
apply here as we have a single instrument.
18 We implement the IV strategy using the control 
function method. This involves estimating the first -stage using a probit model and , in the 
second stage of IV, we use the residual from the first stage as an additional regressor.
19  
 
4.  Estimation Results 
4.1.  Determinants of Corruption  
 
We first estimate Eq. (1) to examine how household characteristics and red tape variables 
affect various types of corruption and the amount of bribe a household pays as a result.  Our 
primary interest is to see whether poorer people with lower socio-economic characteristics 
suffer more from the adverse effects of corruption.  Our overall findings indicate that poorer 
households, households with less educated household head and girls studying in school are 
more adversely affected and that corruption is exacerbated with red tape.  
In Table 2, the probability that a household is subjected to various forms of corruption is 
estimated in models (1), (3) and (5).  The results show that households with less educated 
household head and girls studying in school are more likely to be victims of corruption: the 
coefficients  to  ‘education’  are  negative  and  significant  in  models  (1)  and  (5),  and  the 
coefficients  to  ‘girl’  are  positive  and  significant  in  all  three  models.    For  example,  a 
household with a girl in school is 7.9 percent more likely to pay a bribe for their child’s 
admission into school and 2.4 percent more likely to pay extra fees without receipt.  This is 
consistent with the fact that most of the stipends are directed towards girls.  Therefore, to 
secure the stipend, the parents with girls studying in school interact more frequently with 
teachers and apparently fall victim of extortion more often than those with boys in school.  In 
addition, we find that poorer households are more likely to be subjected to corruption: the 
coefficients to ‘expenditure’ are negative and significant in models (3) and (5).  Models (1), 
(3)  and  (5)  also  show  that  the  three  red  tape  variables  are  significant  contributors  to 
corruption in the education sector.  The marginal effects reported in model (1) indicate that a 
                                                      
18 We also tried alternative variables such as income as the instrument. The first-stage result of the income variable is not 
statistically significant for the urban sub-sample. Thus we chose not to report these results. However, our general findings 
are similar when income is used as an instrument for the rural sub-sample. 
19 We also estimated a Heckman-type selection model where the dependent variable is the amount of bribe. In that case, we 
ran a probit model to estimate the probability of bribe and then use the resulting residual (Mills -ratio) to estimate the 
corruption equation. In this case, we do not exclude any variables (such as education) and assume that the model is identified 
solely based on distributional assumptions. The results do not differ much from those reported in this paper.  12 
 
household is 16.5 percent more likely to pay a bribe for admission when teachers influence 
exam  results  and  44.7  percent  more  when  teachers  force  students  to  take  private  tuition 
outside class.  
The Tobit estimation results for the amount of bribe are more or less consistent with 
those  from  the  probit  models  in  regards  to  both  household  characteristics  and  red  tape 
variables.  For example, in all four models (2), (4), (6) and (7), the results show that poorer 
households, households with  less educated household  head  and  girls  in school  pay more 
bribe.  Together with the probit estimates above, these results indicate that corruption in the 
education sector is more likely to hurt poorer and less educated households and households 
with girls studying in school, both in frequency and in the magnitude of bribe. As expected, 
corruption in the education sector is exacerbated when teachers create multiple layers of red 
tape.  
 
[Table 2 goes about here.] 
 
Although not reported in Table 2, we also find that the household’s religious status plays 
no role in all specifications.  Thus our results differ from Dincer (2008) who finds a positive 
and linear relationship between ethnic/religious polarization and corruption, and an inverse-
U-shaped  relationship  between  ethnic/religious  fractionalization  and  corruption.  More 
importantly,  our  results  are  in  contrast  to  the  findings  of  Svensson  (2003),  Hunt  (2004, 
2007b), Hunt and Laszlo (2005), and Mocan (2008).  These authors report that the burden of 
corruption increases with the income of the private agent dealing with public officials.  For 
example, based on cross-country data, Mocan (2008) finds that high-income individuals have 
higher exposure to being asked for a bribe by a government official.  Hunt (2004) reports 
similar findings in relation to bribery and income although she also finds that other factors 
that are conducive to forming informal networks have a larger effect on bribery than income.  
The positive relation between bribery and income continues to appear in Hunt (2007b) in a 
study of public health care in Peru and Uganda, in Hunt and Laszlo (2005) in a study on 
bribes paid by households in Peru, and in Svensson (2003) in a study of firms paying bribes 
in Uganda.   
The negative relation we find between corruption and income is in line with Hunt (2008) 
who finds that, among crime victims who use the police, poorer people are more likely to pay 
bribe.    It  also  lends  some  support  to  Hunt  (2007a),  albeit  in  a  different  context,  that 
corruption can be regressive by affecting the victims of misfortune more adversely.  One 13 
 
possible explanation for the negative relation is the effect of network on corruption.  For 
example, if richer households are more likely to have established networks with influential 
people than poorer households, which they can use to bypass the red tape, then we would 
expect these households to be less likely to be victims of corruption.  We examine this issue 
next. 
 
4.2.  Effects of Network on Corruption 
 
In this section, we estimate Eq. (2) to examine whether informal network connections 
decrease the probability of corruption and the amount of bribe.  We run separate regressions 
for urban and rural households to see if network works differently for these households.  We 
first estimate Eq. (2) using the network variable as reported in the survey.  The results are 
reported in Table 3, where we only report the coefficient estimates for network.  The results 
suggest that network generally matters: it tends to reduce the probability a household pays 
bribe for their child’s education, as well as the amount of bribe the household pays.  As for 
the probability, the estimates in model (1) show that rural (urban, resp.) households with 
network are 18.8 (24.9, resp.) percent less likely to pay a bribe for their child’s admission into 
school, although the coefficient estimates in other models are not significant except that for 
extra  fees  without  receipt.    However,  these  results  may  not  portray  an  accurate  picture 
because of the possible endogeneity of network, which was discussed in Section 3. 
 
[Table 3 goes about here.] 
 
In Table 4, we report estimation results when network is instrumented by education of the 
household  head.    The  validity  of  this  instrument  was  discussed  previously.  We  have 
conjectured in Section 4.1 that the negative relation between household income (proxied by 
expenditure in our model) and corruption might be driven by the effect of network.  That is, 
richer households may be more likely to have access to network connections than poorer 
households, which may enable them to bypass the red tape.  To examine this, we report the 
coefficient estimates for network and expenditure in Table 4.  The results indeed support our 
conjecture.  The coefficients in the IV estimation indicate that a household with network is 
almost certain to avoid paying a bribe for their child’s admission into school as shown in 
model (1).  In addition, a rural (urban, resp.) household with network is 65 (86, resp.) percent 14 
 
less likely to pay extra fees without receipt as shown in model (5), although the coefficient 
estimates in model (3) are not significant as in Table 2.  More importantly, the negative 
relation between expenditure and corruption reported in Table 2 all but disappears in the IV 
estimation, as reflected in the near-insignificant coefficients for expenditure. 
Network helps households to pay reduced amount of bribe as well, although not all the 
coefficient estimates  are significant.    The  IV estimates  in  model (4)  show that an urban 
household  with  network  pays  518  taka  less  to  receive  their  child’s  stipend.    Although 
statistically not significant, network reduces the amount of total bribe a household pays for 
their child’s  education  by  2,076  taka for a  rural  household  and  9,477 taka for  an urban 
household.    This  is  significant  amount  considering  the  fact  that  the  average  household’s 
monthly income is 5,724 taka in rural areas and 9,838 taka in urban areas.  Finally, network 
appears to be more helpful for an urban household in reducing the probability a household is 
subjected to various forms of corruption and the amount of bribe a household actually pays.  
This is consistent with anecdotal evidence that urban households face stiffer competition in 
getting their children admitted to a school of their choice.  Alternatively one may argue that 
other forms of bilateral informal networks are more likely to form in rural areas (Hunt, 2004), 
which may render the effect of ‘network through third party’ as we focus on in our study less 
pronounced than in urban areas.  In sum, out results show that network can be a substitute for 
a bribe when a household faces red tape in having access to public service: those without 
established network have no choice but to pay a bribe; those with network can bypass the red 
tape or pay a smaller amount of bribe. 
 
[Table 4 goes about here.] 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
This  paper  has  studied  the  incidence  and  amount  of  bribe  households  pay  for  their 
children’s education in Bangladesh.  Our empirical analysis is based on the 2007 household 
survey data collected by Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), which measure actual 
corruption.  Our main findings are (i) both the incidence of corruption and the amount of 
bribe increase in the level of red tape, (ii) poorer households, households with less educated 
household head, and households with girls studying in school are more likely to be victims of 
corruption,  (iii)  households  with  higher  social  status  proxied  by  the  household  head’s 15 
 
education level or the household’s expenditure are more likely to rely on informal network to 
bypass  the  red  tape  or  pay  less  amount  of  bribe  and,  as  a  result,  (iv)  corruption  in  the 
education sector is likely to be regressive.  
Overall, our results show that corruption at the school level creates unequal access to 
education and imposes unnecessary costs on households in educating their children.  The 
burden  falls  disproportionately  on  households  from  economically  disadvantaged  groups.  
This may offer a partial explanation to why school enrolment rates have been low and drop-
out rates have been high in Bangladesh in recent years despite government efforts to improve 
the education sector.  This, along with the regressive nature of corruption in the education 
sector, points to worsening inequality and investment in human capital, which may hamper 
sustainable  growth  and  create  long-term  poverty.    Needless  to  say,  any  policy  aimed  at 
improving the education sector should go hand in hand with the measures to fight corruption 
in the education sector.  
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Table 1:  Basic Descriptive Statistics
 
 
Rural  Urban 
Variables  Mean  S.D  Mean  S.D 
Household characteristics 
     Age   47.39  14.39  46.5  13.48 
     Sex  0.94 
 
0.91 
       Education  4.73  3.99  7.63  4.91 
     Expenditure  8.48  0.56  8.96  0.66 
     Religion   0.9 
 
0.9 
       Sex of the Respondent   0.87  0.34  0.73  0.45 
     Female adults  2.67  1.43  2.65  1.45 
     Male adults  3.03  1.6  2.92  1.58 
     Land  154.73  309.13  114.46  354.57 
     Girl  0.92  0.82  0.94  0.85 
     Boy  0.98  0.86  1  0.85 
 
Network  0.38 
 
0.45 
   
Red-tape 
     Irregular class   0.14 
 
0.12 
       Private tuition   0.32 
 
0.31 
       Exam influence   0.07 
 
0.11 
   
Outcome Variables 








     Bribe for admission (tk)^  211.44  1616.90  1039.81  4189.50 
     Bribe for stipend (%)  0.45    0.24   
     Bribe for stipend (tk)^  85.80  120.32  115.38  174.40 
     Extra fees without receipt (%) 









     Total bribe (tk)^  156.65  1189.5  498.89  2774.8 
Number of Observations  2154  1482 
Note: Number of observations varies depending on the outcome variables. ^ indicates the 
average amount for only those who paid. The mean of total bribe is not equal to the sum of 
the means of all other bribes since the number of households that paid each type of bribe is 
not the same. 
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Table 2: Reduced Form Regression Results for the Determinants of Corruption in School 
 
 
Note: Probit ME stands for probit marginal effect. Each regression also includes thana fixed effects and other covariates reported in Table 1. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the police station level. **, *, + denote significant at the 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively.  
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  Bribe for 
admission 




Bribe for   
stipend  
(Probit ME) 




without receipt  
(Probit ME) 
Extra fees       
(tk) 
(Tobit) 
Total bribe      
(tk) 
(Tobit) 
Age   -0.000649  -10.9+  0.001207  -2.0**  -0.000327  -0.2  -10.9+ 
  (0.000825)  (6.0)  (0.000952)  (0.6)  (0.000569)  (0.5)  (6.0) 
Sex  0.039477  -104.3  0.010429  69.0*  0.032062  27.3  -104.3 
  (0.044034)  (315.3)  (0.054640)  (33.1)  (0.027926)  (30.2)  (315.3) 
Education  -0.010713**  -48.0*  0.001747  -4.5+  -0.009713**  -5.2**  -48.0* 
  (0.002395)  (19.8)  (0.003164)  (2.3)  (0.001908)  (1.6)  (19.8) 
Expenditure  -0.035639  -258.3  -0.111889**  -40.5+  -0.074919**  -47.9**  -258.3 
  (0.026070)  (186.5)  (0.031722)  (21.0)  (0.018794)  (14.9)  (186.5) 
Girl  0.079256**  253.2**  0.152100**  118.3**  0.024469*  26.1*  253.2** 
  (0.011300)  (77.3)  (0.019783)  (19.3)  (0.010090)  (11.7)  (77.3) 
Irregular class  0.038721**  165.9+  0.033783*  0.8  0.018086+  22.1*  165.9+ 
  (0.011540)  (88.6)  (0.015848)  (14.7)  (0.010022)  (9.2)  (88.6) 
Private tuition  0.446876**  560.4*  -0.023661  19.8  0.105069**  73.6**  560.4* 
  (0.025415)  (240.4)  (0.034268)  (26.0)  (0.024927)  (19.3)  (240.4) 
Exam   0.164857**  223.2  0.189331**  23.6  0.034688+  33.8*  223.2 
influence  (0.030371)  (138.0)  (0.027750)  (18.6)  (0.018729)  (16.3)  (138.0) 18 
 
Table 3: Simple Probit/Tobit Estimates: The Role of Network in Corruption  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 




Bribe for   
stipend  
Bribe for  
stipend (tk)  
Extra fees 
without receipt  




Rural area  -0.1882**  -95.16  -0.0113  1.01  -0.0738*  -20.21  -183.62+ 
  (0.0428)  (138.32)  (0.0365)  (19.27)  (0.0355)  (19.10)  (103.64) 
Urban area  -0.2485**  -137.72  0.0485  15.85**  -0.0265  -35.98  -88.13 
  (0.0534)  (720.50)  (0.0497)  (0.84)  (0.0367)  (34.95)  (253.42) 
Note: The number of observations varies slightly between regressions. Each regression also includes thana fixed effects and the full set of covariates 
reported in Table 1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the police station level. **, *, + denote significant at the 1, 5, 10 
percent level, respectively. 
 19 
 
Table 4: IV Estimates for the Role of Network in Corruption 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 




Bribe for   
stipend  
Bribe for  
stipend (tk)  
Extra fees 
without receipt  





Network  -0.9233***  -2,587.0  -0.0157  -387.7  -0.6494***  -143.8  -2,076.2 
  (0.1118)  (1,622.9)  (0.6353)  (376.5)  (0.2371)  (278.1)  (1,297.1) 
Expenditure  0.055  -262.6  -0.074  4.6  -0.046  -29.1  -239.1 
  (0.063)  (363.7)  (0.083)  (46.4)  (0.067)  (27.9)  (264.9) 
No. of Obs.  1430  1448  913  899  1234  1336  1448 
Urban:             
Network  -0.9895***  -16,352.1  -0.3688  -517.7***  -0.8588***  -558.3  -9,476.8 
  (0.0468)  (11,509.1)  (0.6138)  (9.6265)  (0.1464)  (382.2)  (6,018.9) 
Expenditure  0.048  1,337.7  0.079  -60.1***  0.037  -15.5  796.8 
  (0.070)  (1,472.3)  (0.092)  (0.151)  (0.060)  (42.7)  (814.1) 
No. of Obs.  971  971  446  488  662  795  971 
Note: The number of observations varies slightly between regressions. Each regression also includes thana fixed effects and the full set of covariates 
reported in Table 1. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the police station level. **, *, + denote significant at the 1, 5, 10 















Table A1: Variable Definition 
Variables  Description 
Household Characteristics 
     Age 
 
Age of household head 
     Sex  Sex of household head (male = 1; female = 0) 
     Education  Years of education attained by household head 
     Expenditure  Log of household’s monthly expenditure in taka 
     Religion  Household’s main religion (Muslim = 1; others = 0) 
     Female adults 
     Male adults 
     Sex of the respondent 
Number of female adults in the household 
Number of male adults in the household 
Male = 1, female = 0 
     Girl  Number of girls studying in school 
     Boy  Number of boys studying in school 




If the household used network with influential people to get help in 
receiving education for children or any other service for their own 
purpose (yes = 1; no = 0) 
 
Red-tape variables 
     Irregular class 
 
 
If the school did not hold regular class during the school period (yes 
= 1; no = 0) 
     Private tuition  If teachers forced students to take private tuition (yes = 1; no = 0) 
     Exam influence  If teachers influenced exam results (yes = 1; no = 0) 
 
Outcome Variables 
     Bribe for admission 
 
 
If the household paid bribe for their child’s admission into school 
(yes = 1; no = 0) 
     Bribe for admission (tk)   The amount of bribe in taka paid for child’s admission into school  
     Bribe for stipend  If the household paid bribe to receive the stipend for their child (yes = 
1; no = 0) 
     Bribe for stipend (tk)  The amount of bribe in taka paid to receive the stipend 
     Extra fees without receipt  If  the  household  made  any  donation  or  paid  extra  fees  to  school 
without receipt (yes = 1; no = 0) 
     Extra fees (tk)  The amount of money in taka paid for donation and other extra fees  
     Total bribe (tk)  The total amount in taka paid for admission, stipend, extra fees, and 
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Table A2: First-Stage – Determinants of Informal Network 
Variables  Rural  Urban 
Age   0.0010  0.0011 
  (0.0012)  (0.0016) 
Sex   0.0192  0.0089 
  (0.0705)  (0.0705) 
Education   0.0098**  0.0082** 
  (0.0047)  (0.0039) 
Religion   0.1016  -0.0317 
  (0.0682)  (0.0762) 
Sex of the respondent  0.0269  -0.0637 
  (0.0587)  (0.0478) 
Household size*  -0.0034  -0.0046 
  (0.0074)  (0.0103) 
Expenditure  0.0876**  0.0334 
  (0.0414)  (0.0481) 
Boy  -0.0214  0.0256 
  (0.0176)  (0.0277) 
Girl  -0.0152  0.0568** 
  (0.0195)  (0.0222) 
Regular class  -0.0700*  -0.0492 
  (0.0399)  (0.0436) 
Private tuition  0.0120  -0.1354*** 
  (0.0304)  (0.0379) 
Exam influence  -0.0092  0.0677 
  (0.0471)  (0.0572) 
Observations  1423  971 
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